Kockičicin iBlob

Analyst predictions tell the story, in the simplest way. As measured by operating system, IDC predicts that Symbian will go from 20.6 percent global market share this year essentially to zero in 2015. Meanwhile, Windows Phone — Nokia’s new primary mobile operating system — will reach 20.3 percent in four years. That’s less than a zero-sum gain, since Nokia isn’t the sole Windows Phone distributor.

***

Oni koji veruju u Microsoft-Nokia partnerstvo vide najvećeg proizvođača telefona, koji se borio sa problemom softvera, koji se pridružuje najvećoj softverskoj kompaniji (koji se sama borila sa svojim projektom mobilnog telefona, Micorosoft Kin). Oni misle da ova dva giganta mogu formirati savršeno partnerstvo ili približno velikog globalnog giganta, koji kombinuje veštine i talente oba.

Sa druge strane, osećaj da, iako je to tačno, nedavni koraci koje su preduzele ove kompanije urušavaju šansu za ovo partnerstvo. Kada je Nokia objavila da napušta razvoj sopstvenog Symbian operativnog sistema i prebacivanje svih smartfona na Microsoft Windows Phone OS, to je u istom momentu učinilo sve postojeće Symbian Nokia uređaje zastarelim. To se zove „Ozborn sindrom“.

„Sada izgleda kao da je Nokia stavila sva svoja jaja u korpu, a ona se odjednom slomila. Plašim se da će vesti iz Nokije biti sve lošije u drugom, trećem i četvrtom kvartalu ove godine, i da će vrednost akcija ove kompanije nastaviti da pada.

Ako se tako nastavi, Nokia će ubrzo biti prodata nekom od svojih rivala.“

To znači da su odmah u februaru 2011. čak najmoderniji i najsvežije predstavljeni Nokia telefoni, kao što su N8 i E7, bili viđeni kao zastareli i njihova prodaja je propala. Da je bilo šanse da se u prodaji ubrzo pojave Microsoft telefoni, to ne bi bio dugoročan problem, ali znamo da prvi Microsoft telefoni iz Nokije neće biti isporučeni pre kraja ove godine, i samo u nekim zemljama do Božića. To znači da će gotovo sav Nokijin profit, koji dobijaju od svoje smartfon jedinice, nestao preko noći. Plašim se da Nokia ne može preživeti do kraja godine, zato što izveštaji govore da su mnogi operateri stopirali prodaju Nokia smartfona i time zapravo bojkotovali prodaju.

Nokia je bila profitabilna kompanija i imala velike novčane rezerve. Ona će možda preživeti do kraja godine koristeći njih. Ali, sada čujemo da je Microsoft kupio Skype. Nažalost, mislim da to znači kraj Microsoft baziranih smartfona, zato što mobilni operateri mrze Skype. Pa, ako je Microsoft kompanija koja poseduje Skype, operateri neće želeti da podržavaju uređaje koje Microsoft prodaje. A sada će ti Microsoft telefoni koje Nokia želi da proda odjednom postati nepoželjni. Američke novine, kao što su San Francisco Chronicle i Boston Globe, nedavno su izveštavale o bojkotu Microsoft telefona.

Tako da sada izgleda kao da je Nokia stavila sva svoja jaja u korpu, a ona se odjednom slomila. Plašim se da će vesti iz Nokije biti sve lošije u drugom, trećem i četvrtom kvartalu ove godine, i da će vrednost akcija ove kompanije nastaviti da pada. Ako se tako nastavi, Nokia će ubrzo biti prodata nekom od svojih rivala.

Nokia ima vredne delove kao što je distribuciona mreža, fabrike, patent portfolio i bilo koji veliki rival kao što su Samsung ili ZTE što se proizvođača tiče, ili Google i MS u softveru ili HP i Dell u kompj sektoru može poželeti da kupi delove Nokije i proda ostalo.

***

Even last week, while gadget bloggers and reviewers cooed over Nokia N9, which will run MeeGo 1.2, Elop made counter-marketing statements, making clear that a successful N9 would still be the end for MeeGo.
Elop’s problem is leadership. He hasn’t demonstrated nearly enough, and there Nokia’s board is at fault for making him chief executive. Elop’s idea of leadership is selling Nokia’s soul to Microsoft and essentially letting Ballmer and his team take responsibility for software, services and crucial future research and development. It’s a pitiful situation.
Elop should have taken leadership, and it’s not rocket science to see where. I’ve randomly picked eight areas:
1. Expand Nokia’s strategy of making dumb phones and feature phones smarter. Nokia’s core market wasn’t, and still isn’t, smartphones, particularly in markets like India where until recently market share was about 70 percent. The company had already embarked on a strategy for bringing smartphone features to other handset categories. The concept was right, but the execution needed refinement, starting with moving new products to market faster (see #7).
2. Release some truly competitive smartphones — not just hardware, but software and services. Again, the N9 and N950 show that Nokia was finally on the right track. Take a look at last week’s tech blogger and reviewer N9 write-ups. They nearly universally are: „Wow, I’d buy this phone if MeeGo wasn’t a dead end“. Federal Communications Commission info on the N950 shows what an incredibly good smartphone it could be.
N9′s muted enthusiasm shows that with the right marketing, and more importantly support from the chief executive’s office, there was a hit in the making — and one capable of turning negative perceptions positive.
3. Improved sync and services. Synchronization is the killer application for the connected era. But Nokia didn’t get sync, or supporting services like contacts and mail, right. Ovi was good in concept — not execution. But the April deal with Yahoo, for bulking up Ovi services was move in the right direction. I hear lots of complaints about how Nokia does good hardware but not software. Actually sync and cloud services are the problem, and it’s one easily solved through the right partnership if not refocused development.
4. Reignited cameraphone marketing. Nokia has long shipped simply the best cameraphones in its high-end feature phones and smartphones. Carl Zeiss lenses, LED flashes, physical shutter buttons and more distinguished Nokia cameraphones long before Apple shipped one iPhone. In a way, Nokia brought great technology to market too early. The market is ripe for what Nokia has got.
5. Worked with developers to produce newer and better localized applications — social networking, too. One of Nokia’s platform strengths: Applications and services broadly available for specific regions and languages, particularly in Europe and emerging markets in Africa and Asia. Nokia should have spent Elop’s first nine months supporting developers. The apps would be important for holding onto existing customers and migrating them to smarter Nokia handsets.
6. Broadly pushed out a mobile money service quickly. The other killer application for the connected era is mobile money. Nokia already has a mobile money strategy/service. The company should have pushed quickly to spreading its mobile payment/banking system across the install base, also working with some of the truly successful services spreading out of Africa.
7. Shortened product release cycles. Nokia takes too long from product announcement to handset availability. See my story from last week, for more on this one.
8. Negotiated major US distribution deals for Nokia smartphones. Would this be so hard for a Canadian CEO to do? In doing so, do some aggressive Nokia marketing in North America.
The point: These all were strategies underway before the Elop era. Nokia had already started to realign in the right direction. The company simply needed a leader who could accelerate plans and get products and services to market faster. Instead, Elop derailed the Nokia Express to get the train on the Windows Phone tracks. None of these existing assets could make a difference alone. They’re all needed, with the right leadership behind them. Nokia hasn’t got it.

***

Architengi Jun 27, 2011 – 6:41 PM
Elop, on Feb 11th, told the world the big lie: „Nokia has platforms that are on fire“ (referring to Symbian^3-Anna and MeeGo). Not only we can see now that Symbian^3 Anna-Bella are excellent for the mid-hardware with 256 MB RAM, and MeeGo simply is better than iOS and Android for high-end smartphones, so Elop lied, but we see what his announcement did:

* Because Elop declared Symbian^3-Anna on fire, the sales of Nokia smart-phones are crushed.
* Nokia lost more than 16 billions $ only till now because operators now boycott Nokia smartphones that Elop announced Symbian^3 and MeeGo end-of-life
* Nokia lost 21 billion $ in Market Capitalization
* Nokia Stock crashed from $11.5 on Feb 11 to $5.8 now. Half. Lowest in 13 years. The biggest drop in just few months. After Elop’s Feb 11.